# Corporatism paper – theory

* Core voters
* Social democrats == union members
* Christian democrats/Centre right == business
* General public opinion [exogenous public opinion shocks, pro/anti climate]
* Institutional reasons [electoral system] why some matter more than others
* Core voters
* ???
* Party competition
* MVT logic
* Core voters’/constituencies’ interests
* Strength of green party
* Low strength == allows for greater movement against pro-climate opinion because worse opportunities for desertion
* High strength == allows for less movement against pro-climate opinion because better opportunities for desertion
* Corporatism constraint
* Social democrats cannot soak business
* Centre right cannot completely ignore workers’ concerns

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* Constellations/configurations
* Pro-climate opinion shock, but core constituencies of centre-left and centre-right negatively affected by climate policy
* Public opinion shock pushes towards more climate policy because of median voter logic, though this depends on
* certainty about MVT’s position
* Core constituency interests push in the opposite direction
* No clear prediction regarding stringency? [maybe yes, because both cores are against so that it should be negative?]; structure depends on nature of adverse consequences for both core constituencies
* Examples? Pendlerpauschale?
* Pro-climate opinion shock, but core constituency of centre-left negatively affected by climate policy, not so much core constituency of centre-right
* Public opinion shock pushes towards more climate policy because of median voter logic
* Centre-right follows MVT logic, but its instrument choice is affected by centre left tension
* Low salience instruments [inefficient]: Higher ambition [Can we make that prediction?], but realised with more inefficient instruments, i.e. at greater cost
* Centre left’s movement depends on:
* relative strength of public opinion and core voters’ interests [they will weigh stronger, the weaker unions are; explain this at greater length]
* certainty about MVT’s position
* willingness of core voters to desert to Green party
* coalition inclusion probability?
* Pro-climate opinion shock, but core constituency of centre-right negatively affected by climate policy, not so much core constituency of centre-left
* Public opinion shock pushes towards more climate policy because of median voter logic
* Centre-left follows MVT logic, but its instrument choice is affected by centre right tension
* Pricing instruments with exemptions [e.g. free allocations] and only moderate compensation [because centre right represents rich]
* “Inefficiencies” depend on extent and nature of businesses’ vulnerability -> higher ambition?
* Centre-right’s movement depends on
* relative strength of public opinion and loyalty of their core voters
* certainty about MVT’s position
* willingness of core voters to desert to Green party [attractiveness for the rich]
* coalition inclusion probability?
* Pro-climate opinion shock – neither core constituency negatively affected, perhaps even positively affected
* Public opinion shock pushes towards more climate policy because of median voter logic
* Both parties adopt more pro-climate positions because of MVT logic
* Core constituencies’ interests and public opinion reinforce one another – no tension, though strength of incentive depends on
* uncertainty about median voter’s position
* Valence advantage of Greens [if higher, then incentive for pro-climate movement might be blunted]
* **Prediction: Higher stringency/level of ambition**
* What about structure?
* Probably pretty close to the Finnegan-type sweet spot [carbon pricing + compensation]
* *Go through constellations for anti-climate public opinion shock.*
* Think about visualisation of the problem.
* A group of images of graphs

  Description automatically generated
* What about corporatist bargaining stage?
* Expectations about future relative power by business and labour
* What constraints does corporatist bargaining place on parties’ platforms?
* Teas out predictions for cross-sectional and temporal variation

1. Bring in relative mobilisation capacity

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Stuff I want to read:

* Boix on parties and growth
* Holding the shop together
* Sth on trade politics
* Katzenstein
* Jaeger et al.

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Coalition formation in electoral politics side

Bargaining friction for corporatist side